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Abstract: Retail electric deregulation has been identified in the literature to have favorable price impacts 
to businesses and households because of the introduction of competition into rate-setting. Those studies 
often ignore the important role of regulatory intervention. They are also generally national or multi-state 
aggregated studies that ignore state- and utility-specific dynamics, and most rely on Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) price data that does not account for riders and surcharges on consumer bills, which 
can total more than 60 percent of bills. Using a unique panel of representative, complete electricity bill data 
from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), this paper provides a multi-utility panel regression 
analysis of the effect of retail deregulation on total electric bills in Ohio. The results identify two main 
sources of cross-subsidization that have generally cancelled out the favorable effects of restructuring. Both 
types of cross-subsidies result in substantial burden shifts to residential consumers. 
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The answer to the question “do retail customers benefit?” has long eluded researchers 
studying the emergence, implementation, and impact of electric deregulation, or restructuring. 
Lawmakers and other original proponents of reform argued that improved resource allocation as a 
result of restructuring would trickle down to customers, resulting in reduced electric rates to both 
businesses and households (Winston, 1993). Today, empirical support for these claims remains 
frustratingly opaque (Eto et al., 2006; Joskow, 2008; Kwoka, 2008; Swadley and Yucel, 2011). As 
Bushnell, Mansur, and Novan (2017) note in a recent literature review, “arguably, the most 
fundamental question regarding restructuring relates to its impact on consumers’ electricity prices. 
Here, again, the empirical research is somewhat muddled” (p. 11). In this paper, we provide an 
empirical analysis of the impact of retail electric restructuring using a unique representative total 
bill dataset from Ohio. We evaluate the impact of restructuring on residential, commercial and 
industrial customers, with an explicit focus on cross-subsidization. We find robust evidence of two 
forms of cross-subsidization, inter-class and inter-firm, which we call Type I and II cross-
subsidization.  
Our results indicate that the observed cross-subsidization outcomes can be directly 
attributed to the manner by which Ohio implemented retail restructuring. Rather than requiring 
utilities to functionally separate their generation assets (also referred to as unbundling or 
divestiture—a critically-important stage in the restructuring process), Ohio’s restructuring process 
allowed utilities to simply corporately separate those assets by selling them to a subsidiary. At the 
same time, Ohio retained a rate-setting mechanism that allowed utilities to charge non-bypassable 
riders and surcharges. We find that, by adding non-germane riders (in some cases almost three 
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dozen) to customer bills, Ohio’s utilities were able to recover the post-shale boom losses of their 
predominantly coal-fired deregulated generation subsidiaries.  
We also observe unequal allocation of these costs between customer classes. Accordingly, 
we see evidence of inter-firm cross-subsidization as we detect a highly robust inverse relationship 
between the price of natural gas and the actual retail price of electricity. Historic declines in the 
marginal input fuel, natural gas, resulted in loses to deregulated coal plants. Riders and surcharges 
on regulated utility customer bills provided the pathway to recover those loses. We also see 
evidence of inter-class cross-subsidization as we observe robust differences in price effect by 
customer class. We find the same results in a set of companion models based on the wholesale 
electricity price.  
Ohio provides natural experiment conditions that allow us to further investigate these 
results. One of the major utilities in the state, serving the Cincinnati metro area, pursued functional, 
rather than corporate separation. Unlike the other distribution utilities, they had no instrumental 
incentive to pursue cost recovery for affiliate generation through riders. For Cincinnati, we find 
equally-robust results in the opposite direction, providing further empirical support for the 
importance of regulatory structure in influencing the outcome of restructuring. 
We begin with a concise summary of the empirical literature on retail restructuring and 
cross-subsidization. We then provide an assessment of our data in comparison to the literature’s 
longstanding reliance on Energy Information Administration (EIA) price data, which does not 
account for riders and surcharges that flow through to subsidiary corporations. In Section 2, we 
provide a concise history of Ohio’s experience with restructuring and position our work within the 
larger body of literature. Sections 3 and 4 provide our empirical data and methodology, and Section 
3 
5 provides the empirical results. Section 6 concludes with implications for future research in the 
field and analysis for other states that have implemented restructuring in similar ways.  
 
1.1 Prior Empirical Research 
Empirical research on the effect of retail restructuring is inconclusive at best. Apt (2005) 
found no net impact in a study of price effects for industrial customers. In contrast, Joskow (2006) 
identified residential and industrial savings associated with retail competition. It has been argued 
that these and other earlier studies include a variety of empirical and theoretical limitations, 
including inadequate or imperfect accounting of confounding market and regulatory changes 
(Kwoka, 2008). Subsequent studies have improved explanatory power and granularity. Swadley 
and Yücel (2011), using choice participation rates as a measure of retail market competitiveness, 
determined that retail prices decreased following retail restructuring. Using EIA retail price data 
and a dynamic panel model of 16 restructured U.S. states and D.C., they found that competition 
reduced retail price mark-ups relative to wholesale price, indicating improved efficiency. Su 
(2015), who assessed the impact of retail choice availability on EIA’s retail price data using a 
national panel from 1990 to 2011, found no impact on commercial and industrial customer prices 
and only short-term price reductions for residential customers. Su attributed these results to rate 
freezes and lower natural gas fuel costs.1  
Ros (2017), who assessed the impact of retail competition on average revenue per unit sales 
using a 72-utility panel from 1972 to 2009, found that retail restructuring lowered prices, but that 
the impact varied by customer class.2 More specifically, Ros found residential, commercial, and 
 
1 Su does find that full retail choice (i.e., choice available to all customer classes) does benefit industrial customers, but attributes 
this result to spillovers from protections put in place for residential customers. 
2 In his study, average revenue per unit sales is a proxy for price, as derived from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
Form 1 Data.  
4 
industrial price impacts of -4.3%, -8.2%, and -11.1%, respectively. His results indicate that over 
time these benefits deteriorate, remain static, and increase for residential, commercial, and 
industrial customers, respectively. Hartley, Medlock, and Jankovska (2017) employed total bill 
data from Texas and found a benefit to residential customers from retail choice as compared to 
non-restructured parts of the state. They attribute this savings to declining service provider costs, 
reduced price mark-ups, and the increased pass-through of wholesale market costs. Like several 
other studies, theirs linked retail rates to the cost of the marginal fuel source, natural gas. Other 
studies of Texas have reached similar conclusions regarding the effect of natural gas price on rates 
(McKearin, 2015; Whitworth and Zarnikau, 2006; Woo and Zarnikau, 2009). 
Empirical research specifically on restructuring and cross-subsidization has been thin. 
Nagayama (2007) evaluated industrial to residential electric price ratios relative to GDP per capita 
and maturity of electric market reform in an 83-nation longitudinal study. The findings indicated 
that market reforms have inconsistent impacts on prices and cross-subsidization depending upon 
the type of economy and maturity of markets, with the general result suggesting that industrial 
prices fell most after reform in developing countries. Erdogdu (2011) expanded on Nagayama’s 
work by incorporating developed countries and additional fuel-cost controls into a 63-nation panel 
of price-cost margin and cross-subsidy ratios from 1982 to 2009. Again, the results suggested that 
most market reforms appear to have inconsistent, country-specific effects. The study also found, 
however, that the introduction of retail choice increases cross-subsidization in developed 
countries.3 Erdogdu interprets this as decreased efficiency.  
 
3 The exact direction of the effect is unclear due to the use of the absolute value of deviation in price ratio as the dependent variable. 
Nonetheless, separate models indicate falling residential price-cost margin and insignificant change in industrial customer price-
cost margin due to retail choice. This implies that the cross-subsidy increases in favor of residential customers. 
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Besides empirical assessments, several scholars attribute changes in cross-subsidization to 
market reform. Su (2015) theorized that cross-subsidization from residential to industrial 
customers dissipated after the introduction of retail competition, partially explaining residential 
cost decreases. Hartley, Medlock, and Jankovska (2017) argued that the elimination of cross-
subsidization from commercial to residential customers partially explains decreases in commercial 
and industrial costs after retail restructuring. Of crucial importance is the explanation for the 
functional mechanism by which restructuring would cause, or change, inequalities in the relative 
price of electricity as measured by the inter-class price ratio. This is unfortunately absent or 
incomplete in all of the available literature due to the absence of thorough cost-of-service 
allocation information by customer class. While this paper does not solve this longstanding issue, 
by using final bill data and estimating inter-firm cross-subsidization, it provides some evidence 
that changes in relative prices across customer class cannot be completely explained by the 
unwinding of any pre-restructuring cross-subsidies. This is because we also observe significant 
inter-class differentials in inter-firm cross-subsidization. 
 
1.2 Improved Metrics 
A critical shortcoming of nearly all prior research is its reliance on EIA 826 data, which 
provides an incomplete assessment of total bills that residential, industrial, and commercial 
customers receive. This is because it is based on a simplified ratio of reported distribution utility 
revenue to customer count, or sales volume. It misses important aspects of complex holding 
company structures that define nearly every utility in the country. In many cases, EIA data miss 
indirect costs and other flow-through revenues that all customers see in the form of non-bypassable 
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riders and surcharges, which can amount to over 60 percent of the total bill.4 With the exception 
of Hartley, Medlock, and Jankovska (2017), all previous empirical research on electric 
restructuring in the U.S. has relied on bill proxy data rather than total bill data. 
Relatedly, empirical work in the U.S. has generally relied on aggregate multi-state panel 
data. In so doing, it has overlooked key state- and utility-level policy interventions (like 
divestiture). It also oversimplifies restructuring status by reducing or ignoring variation both within 
and between states. The exclusion of these crucial details can produce non-trivial identification 
error. For example, recent multi-state longitudinal studies such as Su (2015) and Ros (2017) used 
EIA’s Status of Electricity Restructuring reports to code the year of restructuring. This report is 
based upon passage of enabling legislation—rather than when the legislation was actually 
implemented. Ros’s panel data codes Ohio restructuring as beginning in 2001, and his panel ends 
in 2009. But in Ohio, as discussed below, the actual tariff mechanism that permitted customer 
switching coincided with the passage of Senate Bill 221 in 2008. As a result, no real switching 
occurred during the last nine years of his panel, representing the entirety of his policy intervention 
period for the State of Ohio. This begs the question of what these prior studies are actually 
measuring, as it is likely that they are conflating secondary market effects with restructuring 
effects. 
The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) publishes detailed representative total 
bill data on a monthly basis for all customer classes separately. Using this data, this paper provides 
a more fine-grained panel analysis of seven metro areas in the State of Ohio corresponding to 
utility service areas, accounting for important subtleties omitted from prior research (e.g., actual 
 
4 Non-bypassable riders are revenues collected by the distribution utility that appear on all customer bills regardless of whether the 
customer has “switched” to obtaining supply from a marketer or not. The interested reader is encouraged to see 155 FERC ¶ 61,101, 
and 155 FERC ¶ 61,102 (April 27, 2016) or Dormady (2017) for a detailed assessment of two large rider proposals that were 
overturned by FERC predominantly because customers who switched away from default service could not opt-out of them. They 
provide a thorough assessment of the issue of non-bypassability. 
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restructuring implementation, divestiture). This paper also provides utility-level assessments of 
the impact of retail restructuring and incorporates greater detail than prior studies by incorporating 
explanatory variables for zonal load-weighted wholesale price, actual final delivery price of fuel 
inputs as opposed to futures prices that do not account for the costs of shipping fuel commodities, 
and all utility operational costs inclusive of labor, capital, amortization, and depreciation.  
Before introducing the empirical analysis, the next section of this paper provides a general 
background on electricity deregulation, with a very brief summary of Ohio’s experience. It then 
explains the conceptual difference between two types of cross-subsidization, necessary for 
understanding the empirical and theoretical contributions of this paper.  
 
2. Theoretical Foundation 
2.1 The Promise of Electric Restructuring 
Electric restructuring consists of a variety of market reforms intended to improve economic 
efficiency. The canonical model of reform in developed countries includes unbundling competitive 
market segments such as generation, introducing new or expanded wholesale markets, establishing 
rules and independent oversight that supports open transmission access, and initiating either 
competitive generation procurement or retail choice (Chao and Huntington, 1998; Hunt, 2002; 
Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983; Joskow, 1989; 1998; 2006).5 The intended outcomes for retail 
rate determination and cost allocation are, in theory, nearly identical to the principles of “cost of 
service” regulation for vertical monopolies: rates should be transparent, encourage investment, 
avoid cross-subsidies, and foster efficient decision-making by customers and utilities alike 
 
5 The literature principally deals with two forms of unbundling: corporate separation, and full divestiture (Bushnell, Mansur and 
Saravia, 2008; Ishii and Yan, 2007; Kwoka, et. al., 2010; Mansur, 2007). Empirical evidence in support of either approach is 
limited. 
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(Phillips, 1993).6 A longstanding and well-respected literature has justified a healthy skepticism 
that these goals can be achieved under traditional regulatory designs (Averch and Johnson, 1962; 
Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974; Stigler and Friedland, 1962). The claims of proponents of 
restructuring thus highlighted these well-established shortcomings of regulatory systems, arguing 
that market-based reforms would improve efficiency to all customers. Although theorists believed 
scale economies, principally benefiting the commercial and industrial classes, would be unaffected 
by restructuring, both scholars and practitioners also argued that reforms would “reduce the 
magnitude of the subsidies and gradually eliminate those that do not have broad public support” 
(Joskow, 1998, p. 45). This is due to the “sunlight” of transparent and impartial open markets.7 
 
2.2 Retail Restructuring (Customer Choice) 
Retail (rather than wholesale) restructuring is an important subcomponent of overall 
electricity market reform because it establishes the mechanism by which the benefits of wholesale 
restructuring are realized by retail customers. After implementing retail restructuring, distribution 
utilities are expected to competitively procure generation. This can be through contracts or 
auctions, or, alternatively, by allowing customers more-direct access to wholesale markets. The 
latter includes wheeling arrangements and customer-directed procurement through competing 
retail suppliers (e.g., brokers or marketers) who purchase generation from wholesale markets on 
behalf of customers. The cost-effectiveness of customer choice, as compared to other competitive 
procurement strategies, is often questioned in the literature (Defeuilley, 2009; Joskow, 2000; 
Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983; Morey and Kirsch, 2016). Nevertheless, a significant plurality of 
 
6 Perhaps the biggest theoretic difference is a shift from an average cost to a marginal cost basis of rate determination (Borenstein 
and Bushnell, 2015; Woo and Zarnikau, 2009). 
7 For example, electric rates are often used to support rural customers, small businesses, and low-income customers, provide 
economic incentives to attract new industry, prop-up local fuel sources (especially coal), and promulgate environmental policy, 
among other political, social, and economic interventions (Joskow, 1998).  
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states and countries that undertook wholesale restructuring also adopted customer choice in some 
capacity.8  
The literature articulates several potential benefits of consumer choice. For example, it can 
stimulate new products (e.g., aggregation) and services (e.g., green portfolios) as well as create 
liquidity in wholesale markets (Littlechild, 2000; 2002). Ohio adopted both forms of retail 
restructuring: auctions and customer choice. Utilities in Ohio adopted the use of Competitive 
Bidding Price (CBP) auctions to procure default, standard service offer (SSO) supply.9 Both supply 
mechanisms procure generation from the same competitive wholesale markets. Consequently, 
CBP and retail choice offer prices should converge to the same average costs for generation, 
excepting for differences in competitive business practices.10 
 
2.3 Restructuring in Ohio 
Ohio, like many of its peers in the U.S. and other developed countries, followed a winding 
and imperfect path to implementing electric market deregulation.11 It was driven in part by 
declining marginal costs for wholesale power in the 1990s as compared to the higher average cost 
prices paid by retail customers. Industrial and commercial customers, in response, lobbied for 
market reforms and greater wholesale market access. Ohio initiated restructuring in 1999 with the 
passage of Senate Bill (SB) 3, which started a five-year “market development” period during which 
retail rates remained frozen and utilities were allowed to recover stranded costs through transition 
 
8 According to the EIA, 20 U.S. states have adopted some form of liberalized retail choice. The extent of availability differs (e.g., 
limitations to certain customer classes or participation caps) (EIA-861, 2016). 
9 Retail choice allows customers to elect to receive energy services from an alternative, certified retail electric supplier (CRES). 
The SSO is the default option for customers that do not choose an alternative supplier. 
10 For example, prices may diverge from cost in response to product and service offerings (e.g., renewables, line insurance), hedging 
strategies, and other contract terms (e.g., duration, termination fees). In Ohio today, retail choice offers are generally slightly higher 
than SSO offers. This comports with the recent work of Tsai and Tsai (2018) who observe an almost oligopolistic, or Bertrand-like 
price signaling between the regulated SSO offer and CRES offerings in their study of retail choice in Connecticut. 
11 See the works of Littlechild (2008), Thomas, Lendel, and Park (2014), and Dormady, Jiang, and Hoyt (2018) for a more thorough 
overview of Ohio’s deregulation process.  
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charges. The PUCO subsequently delayed retail markets via “Rate Stabilization Plans” (RSPs) 
until, in 2008, Ohio passed SB 221.  
SB 221 officially ended traditional cost-of-service ratemaking for generation and 
established market-based retail ratemaking, including retail choice markets. Under the CBP 
auction design, wholesale providers bid to supply tranches of each distribution utility’s SSO 
obligation, putting pressure on the supply-component of SSO rates to align with wholesale prices. 
Like virtually all states and countries that have restructured to-date, Ohio did not follow the strict 
guidance of early theorists (Hunt, 2002; Joskow, 2008; Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983) in two 
important ways.  
First, Ohio did not require functional separation (divestiture) of generation from the 
distribution utilities, instead allowing “corporate” separation (Dormady, Jiang and Hoyt, 2018). 
This permitted distribution utilities to maintain ownership of their generation fleets (predominantly 
coal) in arms-length subsidiaries (Dormady, 2017). Functional separation is critically-important to 
restructuring (Morey and Kirsch, 2016). In its absence, distribution utilities can be tempted to use 
their regulated retail operations to cross-subsidize their deregulated generation business. Second, 
Ohio retained regulatory intervention in the form of “Electric Security Plans” (ESPs).12 ESPs 
reduced the procedural requirements of utilities for gaining approval for additional cost recovery, 
allowing what practitioners call “single issue ratemaking.” Essentially, SB 221 made it easier for 
utilities to obtain non-bypassable riders and surcharges on customer bills (even those who switched 
to a competitive supplier) in support of an aging generation fleet still on their balance sheets. 
Restructuring in Ohio mirrors the “real world” experience of many other states (e.g., New York, 
 
12 ESPs allow utilities to pursue non-bypassable riders, tariffs, and other price interventions during the SSO determination process. 
For example, AEP’s most recent ESP filing includes at least nine new or modified non-bypassable riders and tariffs, including an 
“Automaker Credit Rider,” a “Basic Transmission Cost Recovery provision for County Fairgrounds” rider, and an “Economic 
Development Rider” (PUCO, 2018). Ohio also established a competitive “Market Rate Offer” (MRO) mechanism for setting SSO 
rates but did not obligate its use. 
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Illinois, Pennsylvania), many of which are still grappling with financial support to incumbent 
utilities and resources.13  
 
2.4 Inter-Class and Inter-Firm Cross-Subsidization 
We examine two types of cross-subsidization, which we designate Type I and II, that can 
affect customer bills: 
1. Type I cross-subsidy identifies cross-subsidization between customer classes (i.e., 
residential, industrial, and commercial) and occurs on the consumption/demand side. After 
retail restructuring in Ohio, SSO customers in all classes observe the same generation 
component price: the price set by the CBP procurement auction which, in turn, is tied to 
the wholesale market price. Transmission and Distribution (T&D) costs remain unchanged, 
as do load-curve related differences in average generation costs.14  In other words, after 
retail deregulation, the only determinants of inter-class difference in the final retail price 
other than usage is the regulated component of the bill. Evidence of Type I cross-
subsidization before or after restructuring would be observed when the relative marginal 
cost of retail electric prices between any two customer classes changes, holding wholesale 
costs unchanged. Regulators may approve Type I cross-subsidies outside of the generation 
component for economic development purposes or for alternative political rationales. 
2. Type II cross-subsidy identifies cross-subsidization between consumers and utility-
affiliated generation units. This type occurs on the production side. Utilities that only 
corporately separate, rather than functionally divest, their generation units retain affiliation 
with the units through a holding company structure, often as a subsidiary corporation. For 
example, AEP created AEP Generation Services Corporation, and FirstEnergy created 
FirstEnergy Generation, LLC to retain ownership of their legacy coal units. Type II cross-
subsidies would tend to be observed when utility-affiliated generation is less profitable 
 
13 For example, several states have implemented “Zero Emission Credit” payments to nuclear facilities which, in effect, subsidize 
the recipient facility’s participation in wholesale markets. As another example, California regulators have given state investor-
owned utilities permission to build fully regulated power plants in direct competition with independent power producers. The 
competition from resources with guaranteed revenue has caused several independent plants to close early (Menezes and Penn, 
2017). 
14 For example, the average generation cost for different customer classes will still differ based on relative time-of-use. 
12 
than independent, non-utility generation participating in the wholesale markets. Whereas 
utilities can pursue cost recovery through both the regulated rates on customer bills and the 
wholesale market, independent generation can only pursue cost recovery through the 
market. In the presence of a Type II cross-subsidy, customers would be offsetting utility 
losses through increased retail prices. 
 
3. Data  
We develop a monthly panel dataset representative of the seven main metropolitan areas 
in Ohio for the period January 2004 through December 2016. In total, the data includes 1,092 
observations, consisting of seven panels across 156 months, and is representative of seven 
utilities.15 We adopt two sets of dependent variables: 1) the marginal price of SSO electricity in 
cents per kilowatt hour for residential, commercial, and industrial customers; and 2) the marginal 
price ratios of residential to industrial price, and residential to commercial price. Electricity price 
data is provided by the PUCO monthly Ohio Utility Rate Survey. Unlike EIA data, the PUCO data 
provides total electric bills (i.e., a representation of the actual bill that customers pay), inclusive of 
generation, T&D, and all other regulatory approved costs such as riders and surcharges. The PUCO 
reports representative total bills based on fixed consumption levels for each customer class (750 
kWh for residential, 300,000 kWh for commercial, and 6 million kWh for industrial). 
There are a variety of advantages to using total consumer bills (Dormady, Jiang, and Hoyt, 
2018; Hartley, Medlock, and Jankovska, 2017). Notably, total bill data includes both direct and 
indirect costs. EIA marginal prices, on the other hand, are estimates derived by dividing revenues 
reported by the distribution utility (i.e., the numerator) by total consumption of electricity (i.e., the 
 
15 These seven utilities are the FirstEnergy affiliates Toledo Edison (Toledo), Ohio Edison (Akron), and the Cleveland Electric 
Illuminating Company (CEI) (Cleveland); the AEP affiliates Columbus Southern Power (CSP) (Columbus) and Ohio Power 
(Canton) (merged effective January 1, 2012); Duke Energy (Cincinnati) (formerly Cinergy Corporation until the acquisition 
completion date of April 3, 2006); and, Dayton Power & Light (DP&L) (Dayton). 
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denominator). The consumption measure often reports all customers of the distribution utility, 
including customers who switched to a competitive supplier. The revenue component of the 
numerator includes only distribution company revenues, excluding revenues obtained on customer 
bills that flow through to parent companies, arms-length subsidiaries, and corporately separated 
generation companies (gencos). Thus, EIA’s price estimates deflate the numerator. And, by 
including customers who have switched to competitive suppliers for their generation in the 
denominator, they can inflate the denominator. Unlike total bill data, EIA data does not allow for 
complete assessments of cross-subsidization and misses costs associated with flow-through 
revenues collected for gencos (i.e., Type II). We provide a time series plot of the panel-average 
inter-class marginal price ratio in Figure 1 for the period both before and after retail deregulation. 
Individual panels are provided in the Appendix B. 
 
Figure 1. Statewide Average Inter-class Price Ratio (Pre- and Post-Restructuring) 
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Types I and II cross-subsidization are measured empirically using four primary explanatory 
variables: the price of natural gas and coal delivered to utilities in Ohio in million British thermal 
units (mmBTUs); the wholesale, load-weighted locational marginal price (LMP) of electricity; and 
a retail restructuring dummy variable. Table 1 and 2 provide descriptions and summary statistics. 
Use of the final delivery price of both gas and coal input fuels captures transportation costs not 
picked up in other studies that rely on futures data.16 Input fuel pricing data is provided in Figure 
2.   
Table 1. Data Definitions, Units and Source 
Variable  Description Unit Source 
Price_Residential Monthly indicative residential marginal price by metro area 
based on complete bill and usage fixed at 750 kWh 
₵/kWh PUCO 
Price_Commercial Monthly indicative commercial marginal price by metro area 
based on complete bill and usage fixed at 300,000 kWh 
₵/kWh PUCO  
Price_Industrial Monthly indicative industrial marginal price by metro area 
based on complete bill and usage fixed at 6,000,000 kWh 
₵/kWh PUCO 
NatGasDeliv_Price Monthly wholesale fuel price for natural gas inclusive of 
delivery cost 
$/mmBTU EIA, EPM, Table 
4.10.A 
CoalDeliv_Price Monthly wholesale fuel price for coal inclusive of delivery cost  $/mmBTU EIA, EPM, Table 
4.10.A 
LMP Hourly PJM and MISO LMPs weighted by hourly load and 
aggregated into monthly rates 
$/MWh PJM, MISO 
Div_Com_Stock Dollar amount of dividends issued to common stock holders Billions 
USD 
FERC Form 1/ 3-Q 
Div_Pref_Stock Dollar amount of dividends issued to preferred stock holders Billions 
USD 
FERC Form 1/ 3-Q 
Tot_Op_Expn Dollar amount of operations expenses for the reporting electric 




FERC Form 1/ 3-Q 
Res_Sales_Mwh Megawatt-hours provided to residential customers by the 
reporting electric entity 
Millions 
MWh 
FERC Form 1/ 3-Q 
Comm_Sales_Mwh Megawatt-hours provided to small commercial firms by the 
reporting electric entity 
Millions 
MWh 
FERC Form 1/ 3-Q 
Ind_Sales_Mwh Megawatt-hours provided to large commercial firms by the 
reporting electric entity 
Millions 
MWh 
FERC Form 1/ 3-Q 
Acronyms: mmBTU: one million British Thermal Units; EIA: Energy Information Administration; EPM: Electric Power Monthly; 
FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; kWh: Kilowatt-hour; LMP: Locational Marginal Price; MISO: Midcontinent 
Independent System Operator; MWh: Megawatt-hour; PJM: PJM Interconnection; PUCO: Public Utility Commission of Ohio. 
Note: Form 1 and 3-Q correspond to the FERC annual and quarterly report of major electric utilities. 
 
16 This would include non-trivial costs collected by rail transport such as Berkshire Hathaway’s BNSF Railway Co.  
15 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price_Residential 13.0492 1.6368 8.7707 18.5557 
Price_Commercial 11.1239 1.9933 6.1407 16.9645 
Price_Industrial 9.2160 2.2724 5.4294 16.2932 
NatGasDeliv_Price 6.5781 3.8801 1.5035 17.7917 
CoalDeliv_Price 2.1312 0.2799 1.5495 2.7359 
LMP 44.0637 13.5698 23.9861 102.9773 
Div_Com_Stock 0.1307 0.0189 0.0000 0.1345 
Div_Pref_Stock 0.0004 0.0043 0.0000 0.0714 
Tot_Op_Expn 0.1735 0.1545 0.0300 1.2806 
Res_Sales_Mwh 0.5696 0.2584 0.1480 1.4972 
Comm_Sales_Mwh 0.4663 0.2373 0.0429 1.3712 
Ind_Sales_Mwh 0.5691 0.2990 0.0052 1.2957 
 
 
Figure 2. Price of Natural Gas and Coal  
Note: Figure provides the monthly inflation-corrected final marginal price of natural gas and coal 
($/mmBTU) delivered to distribution utilities in Ohio between 2004 and 2016. Source: EIA EPM 
Table 4.10A, 2017. 
 
 
We note the historic declines in the price of gas that coincide with the U.S. shale production 
boom beginning in 2008. Hourly wholesale pricing and load data for PJM and MISO, the 
applicable regional energy markets, is obtained from MarketViews and, for some historical MISO 
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load data, from MISO archives.17 For consistency across all years of our panel, we do not use 
PJM’s updated residual metered load aggregate technique adopted in June 2015. We convert 
hourly LMP, inclusive of congestion and losses, to monthly load-weighted average LMP for each 
utility. This captures price adjusted for load and also reflects diurnal cycles and variability related 
to weather, forced or unforced generation outages, as well as other regional market conditions. 




Figure 3: Wholesale Electric Price by Utility Pricing Zone ($/MWh) 
Note: Figure provides inflation-corrected monthly load-weighted locational marginal prices (LMPs) 
for each of the four electric distribution utilities operating in Ohio. Source: PJM, MISO, 
MarketViews. The spike in January 2014 reflects the Polar Vortex.  
 
We also use key control variables. We obtain total utility operations and maintenance cost 
data from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Form 1 (comprehensive annual report) 
and Form 3 (quarterly report) database files. Total operations costs data consists of electricity-
related capital expenditures inclusive of amortization and depreciation, maintenance, labor, 
 


























































































































































































































regulatory and tax expenditures, and operations. Also obtained from Form 1 and 3 data are 
dividends declared common and preferred stock, and total sales in MW by customer class. The 
latter provides an important control for aggregate consumption.  
 
4. Econometric Approach 
We utilize an econometric estimation approach that is well-suited to our data; long-panels 
for seven metro areas. We develop estimation models for each customer class as well as price ratio 
models, described above. Each of the price models estimates marginal retail electric price in 
inflation-corrected cents/kWh. We utilize the same estimation approach for the inter-class ratio 
models.  
Model selection began with a battery of statistical tests. Following Wooldridge (2010) and 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005), we utilized a more robust version of the Hausman test under the 
likely case of a random effects estimator that is not fully efficient. This test also takes into 
consideration that heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and temporal and cross-sectional 
dependency are typical problems embedded in microeconometric data such as long panels 
(Hoechle, 2007). The tests strongly suggest that a fixed effects estimation model will provide more 
consistent estimates. Nonetheless, this version of the Hausman test still considers that neither cross 
sectional dependence of the errors across units nor within units exists in the data. In order to test 
for the validity of these assumptions, we performed the Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test. 
The result implied the presence of cross-sectional dependence of residuals across units (Pesaran, 
2004). We also tested for the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation within units, 
which is common in long panels. Both tests indicated that residuals are not only heteroscedastic 
but also autocorrelated within units. In this case, it is important to estimate standard errors that 
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allow for the modeling of cross sectional dependence, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation. 
Finally, we also performed several tests for unit roots and found that the panels are stationary.  
Given these tests, we adopted a model appropriate to these conditions; a linear panel data 
model that uses a fixed effects, or within regressor, estimator with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
standard errors. The advantage of using a Driscoll-Kraay estimator is that it allows for the 
application of a Newey-West type correction (Newey and West, 1987), accounting for a general 
form of autocorrelation in the residuals. This form of autocorrelation is not restricted to an AR(1) 
process but extends to a more general form, often called spatial correlation, that not only considers 
serial correlation but correlation across panels. This adjustment is also incorporated into the 
sequence of cross-sectional averages of the moment conditions, which ensures a consistent 
estimator of the covariance matrix regardless of the quantity of panels (Hoechle, 2007). The 
general functional form of our estimation models is given by:  
, , , , , , , , , ,
gas gas coal
it i t gas i t gas t coal it it it i itp v                  = + + + + + + + + +d z d z z W C X T  (1) 
, , , , , , , , ,
lmp lmp
it i t lmp i t lmp it it it i itp v                = + + + + + + + +d z d z W C X T    (2) 
where pit,τ is the marginal price per kWh in metro area i at month t of year τ. Our main explanatory 
variables are di,τ and Zt,τ. di,τ is a binary variable that indicates retail restructuring at month t in 
year τ. It takes the value of 1 beginning January 2009.18 The second set of variables, Zt,τ represent 
the final marginal price of delivered input-fuels. Thus, Zt,τ is a vector of input fuel prices for coal 
and gas, as well as monthly load-weighted wholesale LMP for each distribution utility’s pricing 
zone within their relevant regional transmission organization (RTO) market. Although we have 
broadly defined the Z matrix containing input-fuel marginal prices, we have only included gas and 
 
18 The exception is for Dayton which is served by DP&L. In this case, the dummy takes the value of 1 starting in January 2011. 
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coal prices in the general form of model 1 (i.e., zgas and zcoal), on the one hand, and LMP in the 
general form of model 2 (i.e., zlmp).  
We also incorporate vectors associated with additional production side features. Wit,τ is a 
vector representing dividends converted to common and preferred stock for each distribution 
utility. This controls regulatory-approved price changes associated with corporate protectionism 
rather than cross-subsidization. The model also includes total operations costs, capital, and labor 
costs as discussed above, given by vector Cit,τ. This controls for alternative operational cost-based 
arguments, such as price changes due to changes in the cost of production inputs (e.g., labor) or 
the cost of capital. Xit,τ is a vector representing electricity sales, in MWh, for a distribution utility 
and provides a control for monthly demand side effects (e.g., weather, consumption patterns, 
regional growth). 19 All models incorporate year fixed effects that help to address annual changes 
in generation productivity and autonomous energy efficiency improvements (AEEI). These are 
given by Tτ, in which each binary variable takes the value of 1 for year τ (from 2004 to 2016) and 
0 otherwise. As previously mentioned, our models use the Driscoll-Kraay estimator for the 
computation of standard errors. These have the following form: 
1 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ' ) ( ' )TV S
− −= Μ Μ Μ Μ  ,         (3) 
where M is a vector of independent variables and ˆTS  is an estimation of ST, the asymptotic 
covariance matrix. 20 In this case, ˆTS is defined as provided by Newey and West (1987).  
 
19 It is common practice in econometric applications to treat equilibrium prices and quantities as endogenously determined and 
utilize a simultaneous-equation system for estimation. However, as Ros, (2017, p.78) notes, "when prices are regulated, as is the 
case in the electricity sector, the relationship between prices and quantities in a simultaneous-equations system may be weaker than 
in regulated markets and thus perhaps there is less of a need for treating prices and quantities as endogenous." In our case, this is 
underscored further by the fact that we utilize complete bill data that incorporates the entirety of regulated costs, and by the fact 
that the marginal price component is based upon fixed average consumption levels by customer class. We supplement this with a 
full battery of Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests that all fail to reject the null of strict exogeneity. 
20 Readers who are interested in a more detailed explanation should refer to Newey and West (1987), Driscoll and Kraay (1998), 
and Hoechle (2007). 
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itp   represents the ratio of residential 
prices to comparison class k (either industrial or commercial). 
,
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These take a value equal to 1 when the marginal price ratio between classes is equal. It 
takes a value greater than 1 when residential customers observe a higher marginal rate, and less 
than one when residential customers observe a lower marginal rate.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Empirical Tests 
Before introducing the econometric results, we begin with a basic test of Type I cross-
subsidization (i.e., inter-class). We conduct Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests of the null 
hypothesis that the inter-class marginal price ratio is unaffected by retail restructuring. Beginning 
with this basic test provides a high-level assessment in the absence of additional considerations or 
statistical controls. The results are provided in Table 3.  
Under textbook deregulation, including retail restructuring, we would expect one of two 
effects on the ratio of prices between customer classes: 1) no change, as would be the case if cost 
allocation precisely represented cost causation before deregulation with no cross-subsidization; or 
2) recalibration of price ratios to reflect market-based cost causation following the introduction of 
competitive generation pricing via CBP auctions. Almost consistently in each metro area, price 
ratios increased, reflecting a greater disparity between residential marginal price and industrial and 
commercial marginal price, respectively. In most cases the null is rejected at the 0.01 level.  
21 
Deviations from this result are observed in Columbus where we see a statistically-
significant increase in the price ratio for residential to commercial price only. Similarly, in 
Cleveland we observe a statistically significant increase in the residential to industrial price ratio 
only. We also observe slight decreases in both ratios in the Dayton metro area. The largest 
deviation is observed in Canton, where we observe an 8-point decrease in the residential to 
commercial ratio; though we observe a 9-point increase in the residential to industrial ratio there. 
The hypothesis test results generally indicate the presence of Type I cross-subsidy, although they 
do not indicate whether the observed ratio changes are due to the elimination of pre-restructuring 
Type I subsidies or the creation of new Type I subsidies. To more fully understand these results, 
we next turn to our econometric models that allow us to control for key explanatory features to 
further isolate the effects of both Type I and II cross-subsidization. 
Table 3. Pre- and Post-Retail Choice Marginal Price Ratios  
Metro Area 
Residential/Industrial Ratio Residential/Commercial Ratio 
Pre-Retail 
Choice 
Retail Choice      Δ 
Pre-Retail 
Choice 
Retail Choice      Δ 
Akron 1.34 1.45 0.11*** 1.06 1.19 0.13*** 
Canton 1.50 1.59 0.09** 1.36 1.28 -0.08*** 
Cincinnati 1.37 1.46 0.09*** 1.18 1.21 0.03** 
Cleveland 1.10 1.35 0.25*** 1.06 1.06 0.00 
Columbus 1.87 1.88 0.01 1.16 1.23 0.07*** 
Dayton 1.51 1.48 -0.03*** 1.36 1.35 -0.01*** 
Toledo 0.91 1.46 0.55*** 0.96 1.12 0.16*** 
Note: Values indicate the ratio of residential price to the reference class (e.g., 1.5 indicates the marginal price charged to residential 
customers is 150% of the industrial or commercial reference group). The delta column reports the difference between pre- and post-
retail choice marginal price ratios. Asterisks indicate the significance level of Mann-Whitney non-parametric hypothesis tests of 
the mean equality between the two policy periods by metro area. n = 1,092. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5.2 Econometric Results 
The results of our regression analyses are presented in Tables A1 through A5 in Appendix 
A; they are too lengthy to include in the main text of the paper. The outcome variable in the models 
provided in Tables A1 through A3 is the total monthly electric bill marginal price (cents/kWh) for 
residential, industrial and commercial SSO customers. The outcome variable in the models 
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provided in Tables A4 and A5 is the marginal price ratio for residential to industrial, and residential 
to commercial, respectively. 
Each table provides four regression models. Models 1 and 2 use input fuel prices of natural 
gas and coal delivered as explanatory variables. Models 3 and 4 use the load-weighted LMP.21 
Models 2 and 4 provide interactive models that decompose our policy intervention (retail 
restructuring) variable by distribution utility and gas price or wholesale price, respectively. The 
LMP models provide an interaction variable with our policy intervention dummy for post-retail 
deregulation to test for Type II cross-subsidization, which would be supported by a negative 
coefficient on that interaction variable (i.e., declines in the wholesale price associated with 
increases in retail price). The fuel model does the same with the price of natural gas, which is the 
key wholesale price driver in both PJM and MISO.22 All models provide year fixed effects with 
the earliest year in our panel, 2004, excluded as the reference case. 
We represent the main results of the econometric estimation in Table 4. Here we have 
included statewide and individual utility-level effects in a way that interprets the coefficients and 
accounts for interactive effects (i.e., the partial derivatives). The table reports the effects of our 
cross-subsidization measures as well as the effect of the retail deregulation policy itself. We use 
the following expressions to compute the restructuring policy change, change due to gas or 
wholesale price (LMP), and total change, respectively: 
Policy effect (fuel models): ( ) ( ) _1 0 average gaspricepolicy gas
p




= = − = = +
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   (6) 
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
        (7) 
 
21 For purposes of econometric estimation in Models 3 and 4, the spike observed in January 2014, due to the Polar Vortex, has been 
recoded using linear regression-based smoothing. 
22 It is not necessary to provide an interaction term for coal price both because utility-affiliated gencos are almost entirely legacy 
coal plants and there was no major shift in coal prices (as illustrated in Figure 2 above). In other words, there is no expectation 
that changes in coal price could affect Type II cross-subsidy.  
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Policy effect (LMP models): ( ) ( ) _1 0 average lmppolicy lmp
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For simplification, we have avoided some sub-indexes but have kept the same notation for 
parameters and variables representing the policy dummy, gas prices, and LMP included in 
equations 1 through 5.  
The effects reported in Table 4 are based on a panel average natural gas price of 
$3.9/mmBTU and LMP of $37.3/MWh. Gas price and LMP effects, our metrics for Type II cross-
subsidization, are based on the observed decrease (Δz) of approximately $6.5/mmBTU in the 
natural gas price and $30/MWh in the wholesale price, respectively. Importantly, negative 
commodity price coefficients in Tables A1 through A5 reflect unfavorable effects from the 
standpoint of households and businesses; they indicate that with decreasing gas or wholesale 
electricity prices, retail electric prices increased. For ease of exposition, we have interpreted the 
results shown in Table 4 in terms of the effect observed by consumers.  
We would expect that, following adoption of a market-based pricing construct, decreases in 
both the marginal fuel source (natural gas) price and the wholesale market price would be passed 
on to businesses and households as savings. Noting that positive values in Table 4 indicate 
increases in retail rates (except for the price ratio models), we observe that all customers in Ohio 
(with the exception of Duke—the only utility that functionally divested its legacy coal fleet) 
observed increases in the marginal price of electricity in response to the historic declines in both 
the gas and wholesale price. We next interpret these results in greater detail. 
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Table 4. Main Econometric Results Interpreted 
   Price Models Price Ratio Models 




Gas Price  1.888 -- 2.022 -- -- 
Policy  0.214 -- 0.656 -- -0.062 
Total  2.103 -- 2.678 -- -0.062 
Model 3 
LMP 0.912 -- 0.895 -0.031 -0.017 
Policy 0.004 -- 0.426 -- -0.036 





Gas Price  0.519 -- 0.383 -- -- 
Policy  -2.241 -3.596 -1.828 -- -- 
Total  -1.722 -3.596 -1.446 -- -- 
Model 4 
LMP 1.044 -0.047 0.965 -- -0.021 
Policy -1.952 -2.804 -1.948 0.236 -- 





Gas Price  4.324 3.220 4.186 -- -- 
Policy  1.321 1.290 1.882 -- -- 
Total  5.645 4.510 6.068 -- -- 
Model 4 
LMP 1.444 1.215 1.474 -- -- 
Policy 0.718 1.116 1.451 -- -- 





Gas Price  -2.041 -2.473 -1.907 0.148 -- 
Policy  -0.985 -0.709 0.080 -0.003 -- 
Total  -3.026 -3.182 -1.827 0.145 -- 
Model 4 
LMP -- -0.555 -0.509 0.089 0.060 
Policy -- -0.734 -0.260 -0.049 -0.058 





Gas Price  0.335 -- 0.284 -0.139 -0.077 
Policy  -- -- -- -0.148 -0.054 
Total  0.335 -- 0.284 -0.287 -0.131 
Model 4 
LMP 0.331 -- 0.356 -0.059 -- 
Policy -- -- -- -0.163 -0.082 
Total  0.331 -- 0.356 -0.222 -0.082 
 Note: Cells identified with dashes represent statistically nonsignificant effects at the 10 percent level. The effects are based on a 
panel average natural gas price of $3.9/mmBTU and LMP of $37.3/MWh. Gas price and LMP effects are based on the observed 
decrease (Δz) of $6.5/mmBTU in the natural gas price and $30/MWh in the wholesale price, respectively.  





5.2.1 Type I (Inter-class) Cross-Subsidization Results 
The results of the ratio models indicate that retail deregulation generally had small and 
nonsignificant effects on the disparity in electric rates between residential and commercial or 
industrial customers, respectively. In Table 4, we observe very slight but statistically significant 
decreases of between .036 and .062 in the residential to commercial ratio on a statewide basis. We 
note that many of the ratio model coefficients are not statistically significant, however, and are 
thus not incorporated into the total effect in Table 4. This result is driven predominantly by 
reductions in the DP&L and Duke territory residential to commercial ratios. The lack of statistical 
significance in the statewide residential to industrial ratio is also due to disparate results in the 
DP&L and FirstEnergy territories; we observe a statistically significant ratio increase for 
FirstEnergy in Model 4, but also a statistically significant decrease for DP&L in Models 2 and 4. 
There is also a slight decreasing effect for Duke in Models 2 and 4. Thus, the lack of an aggregate 
impact on the largest relative price disparity, the residential to industrial ratio, stems from 
countervailing effects of retail deregulation in three relevant service territories. We next turn to 
evaluations of the price regressions to understand these effects further. 
In all cases and for all customer classes, we observe positive coefficients for the statewide 
policy effect of retail deregulation, as provided in Tables A1 through A3 for Models 1 and 3. 
However, as our models include interaction terms between the policy dummy and the gas price 
variable, we also consider this term when calculating the statewide effect (as indicated in equations 
6 through 10). The results indicate that there has been an overall increase in electric rates for all 
customer classes. However, we observe statistically significant increases in these models only for 
residential and commercial customers. These overall results provide some evidence of Type I 
cross-subsidization in so far as there are disparities in how the market-basis for cost-allocation 
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affects relative prices. In other words, relative prices do not appear to change in the same direction 
(e.g., increase or decrease in relation to broader market factors) or in relation to each other (e.g., 
rates for one class experience inverse changes in relation to another when a previous cross-subsidy 
is eliminated). Instead, restructuring appears to favor the industrial class, which is the only 
customer class to not observe significant rate increases associated with retail deregulation. 
Decomposing these effects by utility, as provided in Models 2 and 4, we can examine 
individual utility effects of retail restructuring. We observe statistically significant decreases in 
residential rates in the FirstEnergy and Duke territories. The statewide effect, however, is mitigated 
by the substantial increase in residential rates in the AEP service territory. Similarly, we observe 
statistically significant commercial customer savings in Model 2 for FirstEnergy, but also 
mitigating price increases for AEP.   
Comparing those results with the industrial price results is most indicative of increased 
Type I cross-subsidization. The general results indicate that, where prices decreased with retail 
deregulation, the greatest savings were allocated to industrial customers. We observe statistically 
significant industrial rate decreases in the FirstEnergy and Duke territories that are larger than 
similar changes in residential and commercial prices. Additionally, where prices increased with 
retail deregulation, they increased the least for industrial customers. Industrial prices, like 
residential and commercial prices, increase in the AEP territory, although at a lower magnitude. 
In other words, industrial customers observe greater gains to the gainers, but fewer losses to the 
losers.  
It is instructive that the effect of retail deregulation is disparate across customer class. The 
mechanism for setting the generation component of SSO customer bills (i.e., the deregulated 
component of bills) is the CBP auction, which results in a single generation price for all three 
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customer classes. Moving to a single generation price should, all things equal, tend to harmonize 
price across customer classes. An alternative explanation for this result, as mentioned above, is 
that moving to a single generation price served to eliminate a pre-existing cross subsidy. An 
increased ratio is plausible if households were benefitting from cross-subsidization before 
restructuring. While we cannot rule this out completely, we can obtain further insight relating to 
Type I cross-subsidy by looking at inter-class differences in the allocation of inter-firm (Type II) 
cross-subsidy, which we turn to next.  
 
5.2.2 Type II (Production Side) Cross-Subsidization 
We next evaluate production side, Type II cross-subsidization, or inter-firm. With the 
precipitous decline in natural gas price associated with the shale boom, Ohio has observed 
significant declines in both the delivered price of natural gas and the load-weighted wholesale 
LMP.23 It has similarly observed a substantial buildup of the natural gas fleet (Dormady, 2017).24 
This has placed utility-affiliated gencos in a precarious position as they are almost entirely coal-
fired.  
The regression results provide strong evidence that the favorable decrease in natural gas 
prices has tended to have an upward (unfavorable) effect on retail electric prices, with the 
exception of the only utility that functionally divested its generation assets—discussed below. Both 
Models 1 and 2 provide regression results of input fuel prices for coal and gas as delivered to Ohio 
 
23 The most common production resource to set the LMP, particularly in the PJM RTO, is natural gas. Thus, gas tends to be the 
marginal resource in the dispatch merit order that most commonly sets the auction-clearing price in the day-ahead and real-time 
markets. 
24 Ohio has observed a monotonically-increasing natural gas generation fleet, predominantly from non-utility-affiliated wholesale 
generation. Between 2004 and 2016, the first and last years of the panel utilized for this analysis, the gas component of the fuel 
fleet has increased from 0.01 percent to 31.7 percent. There is currently approximately 3,000 MW of planned construction in Ohio 
by the year 2020 (see EIA’s Electric Power Monthly Table 6.5, available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/). According 
to PJM, 6,740 MW of capacity was deactivated in Ohio in 2015 and several additional unit retirement requests are pending currently 
(see http://www.pjm.com/planning/generation-deactivation/gd-summaries.aspx). These are predominantly coal-fired units.  
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utilities. Model 1 provides the aggregate statewide marginal effect of gas price, and its interaction 
with the deregulation policy dummy provides the aggregate post-deregulation marginal effect. 
Model 2 decomposes the effects by utility. We note that the monthly average price of natural gas 
delivered to electric generation units in Ohio decreased from over $10/mmBTU before retail 
deregulation, to approximately $3/mmBTU by December 2016. We thus adopt a difference of 
$6.5/mmBTU for the purpose of interpreting coefficients in Table 4.  
We observe an average statewide increase in residential prices that is indicative of Type II 
cross-subsidization. The results suggest that a $6.5/mmBTU decrease in the price of gas during 
the analyzed period has had an overall effect of increasing residential electric rates by 
approximately 1.888 cents/kWh. That exceeds a 500 percent increase as compared with the pre-
deregulation effect of .305 cents/kWh. In a deregulated market that has moved toward a more 
market-based pricing construct for retail power, substantial decreases in the price of a key input 
fuel, like natural gas, should translate in some way to savings to retail customers. Ohio customers 
have observed the opposite effect, however. The decreases in gas price also resulted in losses to 
arms-length, utility-affiliated coal generation. The data indicates that those losses have been cross-
subsidized by the regulated component of retail electric bills. We also observe similar effects for 
commercial rates, with an overall increase of 2.022 cents/kWh during the post-deregulation period. 
It is noteworthy that, in terms of magnitude, the deleterious effects of Type II cross-
subsidization tend to lessen and, in some cases, negate any favorable effects of retail deregulation. 
For example, in the retail price regression models, the net effect of retail deregulation has been a 
slight increase in price of .214 cents/kWh. The total effect, however, swells to a 2.103 cents/kWh 
increase in the rate paid by residential customers when accounting for the Type II cross-subsidy.  
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Evaluating the results of Model 2 allows us to decompose these effects by utility. For all 
customers except Duke (discussed below), we observe unfavorable Type II effects. This is most 
unfavorable for AEP customers, who observe a 5.645 cents/kWh increase in rates with the 
implementation of retail restructuring. In the case of FirstEnergy, although the Type II cross-
subsidy reduced the favorable impact of retail restructuring, the total effect during the post-
deregulation period is still favorable to residential customers, -1.722 cents/kWh. In the DP&L 
territory, we observe an unfavorable effect to residential customers, increased rates by .335 
cents/kWh after retail restructuring.  
The wholesale price models (Models 3 and 4) provide further insights. In the absence of 
Type II effects, we would expect decreases in the wholesale price to correspond with decreases in 
the retail price of electricity, particularly when the CBP auction that sets SSO rates closely tracks 
the wholesale price. However, in the presence of Type II effects, we expect an inverse 
relationship—decreases in the wholesale price correspond with reductions in generation revenue 
that incentivize cross-subsidization by regulatory cost recovery.  
The results of Model 3 directly comport with Type II effects. Prior to retail deregulation 
the mean LMP was $55/MWh, and by the end of the analyzed period, it had fallen to approximately 
$25/MWh. This $30/MWh decrease in the wholesale price of electricity is associated with an 
average increase of .912 cents/kWh in residential retail rates and a .895 cents/kWh increase in 
commercial retail rates. We do not observe statistically significant aggregate effects for industrial 
rates—providing some additional evidence of Type I cross-subsidization.  
Decomposing the wholesale model results by utility, as provided in Model 4, confirms the 
statewide finding. The effects are unfavorable and statistically significant for AEP and 
FirstEnergy, indicating that customers have observed higher retail rates associated with decreases 
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in the wholesale price. A $30 wholesale price decrease is associated with a residential price 
increase of 1.044 and 1.444 cents/kWh for FirstEnergy and AEP, respectively. For commercial 
rates, the increase is .965 cents/kWh and 1.474 cents/kWh, respectively. This adverse Type II 
effect essentially diminishes most, or all, of any favorable effects of retail choice.  
Summarizing these results concisely, where retail deregulation has benefited customers on 
the deregulated component of their bills, the favorable effects have been cancelled out by 
corresponding increases in the regulated component (i.e., riders). And, where retail deregulation 
has had a detrimental effect on the deregulated component of customers’ bills, those adverse 
effects have been compounded by corresponding increases in the regulated component.  
 
5.2.3 Functional Versus Corporate Separation 
Why are the results so strikingly different for Duke Energy (Cincinnati metro area)? Duke 
is the only distribution utility in Ohio that has functionally divested, rather than corporately 
separated, nearly all of its generation assets.25 Duke does not maintain a large legacy coal fleet on 
an arms-length balance sheet, and thus does not have the same need to seek cost recovery to cross-
subsidize the losses of a legacy coal fleet in an era of low gas price. Other distribution utilities in 
the state have only corporately separated their legacy coal fleets—as permitted by the PUCO. For 
them, losses of utility-affiliated generation show up on the distribution utility’s parent company’s 
balance sheets. This creates a perverse cost recovery incentive that ultimately contributes to the 
 
25 This does not include Duke’s Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC) entitlement. Duke, along with seven other utilities in 
both regulated and deregulated markets, owns a small share of the OVEC. OVEC is a cooperative that maintains and operates two 
legacy coal plants which, historically, provided service to a Department of Energy (DOE) managed uranium enrichment plant. 
DOE's agreement with OVEC will end by 2023, and most power requirements already ended in 2003. An inter-company power 
agreement between the sponsoring utilities, however, will run through 2040. As a result, Duke is responsible for nine percent of 
OVEC's power market costs and benefits, equivalent to ownership of approximately 215 MW of coal generation. Prior to 
divestiture, this amounted to less than four percent of Duke's Ohio generation business. Duke, to-date, has had minimal involvement 
in discussions regarding OVEC subsidization. This will likely change if other utilities successfully receive economic support for 
their share of OVEC. 
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inverse relationship between fuel or LMP price and retail price that appears so robustly in the 
econometric models. Duke, which completed a lengthy divestiture process by 2014, does not have 
the same perverse cost recovery motivation.  
For Duke, the results indicate net savings associated with retail deregulation of 
approximately 3.026 cents/kWh for residential, 3.182 cents/kWh for industrial, and 1.827 
cents/kWh for commercial customers, associated with the observed decrease of $6.5/mmBTU in 
the price of gas. Thus, our results would tend to support the conclusion that retail deregulation, if 
accompanied by appropriate divestiture, can mitigate the incentive to seek Type II cross-
subsidization. This is consistent with Morey and Kirsch (2016), who argue that the favorable 
benefits of retail restructuring can be adversely impacted by incomplete functional separation. It 
is also noteworthy that for Duke we still observe proportionately larger savings for industrial 
customers. This suggests that while adequate divestiture may improve Type II cross-subsidization, 
it does not necessarily improve Type I. 
 
6. Implications & Conclusions 
Prior assessments of retail electric restructuring are opaque with respect to inequalities in 
cost. These studies generally rely on EIA data that does not account for customer-funded pass-
throughs associated with holding company structures. Prior U.S. research also generally adopts 
multi-state assessments that overlook important state- and utility-level dynamics, such as 
divestiture status, operational details, and other retail market dynamics. Few undertake an 
empirical analysis of relative changes in cross-subsidization.  
This paper provides a monthly panel analysis between 2004 and 2016 of the effect of 
Ohio’s implementation of retail restructuring on residential, commercial, and industrial complete 
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bills. The results provide evidence that retail restructuring led to two types of cross-subsidization. 
First, the findings suggest that, where customers observed savings associated with retail choice, 
the greatest savings have been observed by industrial customers and, where customers have 
observed cost increases, the greatest increases have been observed by households (Type I cross-
subsidization). Second, the findings suggest that, while customers have generally observed some 
savings associated with the implementation of the competition construct (i.e., the deregulated 
component of their bill), savings have generally been more than offset by cross-subsidies to utility-
affiliated gencos (Type II cross-subsidization). Two robust measures of this effect, using either the 
load-weighted wholesale LMP or the delivered price of natural gas, provide strong evidence that 
increases in customer bills following restructuring occurred in response to losses observed by 
deregulated utility affiliate firms. 
It is noteworthy that Ohio provides a unique natural experiment—this effect occurred in 
almost exactly the opposite direction and magnitude for the only utility in the state that functionally 
divested essentially the entirety of its generation, Duke Energy (Cincinnati metro area). Customers 
in the Duke service territory observed net savings associated with historic declines in the price of 
natural gas after retail restructuring. Decreases in natural gas price and associated declines in 
wholesale market prices are consistently associated with increasing electricity prices in other 
service territories where utilities only corporately separated. Existing literature suggests that 
restructuring should allow retail rates to reflect wholesale rates and the price of the marginal fuel 
resource, typically natural gas. While enabling legislation required 100 percent divestiture of 
generation assets, utilities were permitted to corporately rather than functionally divest those 
assets. By selling those generation assets (almost entirely legacy coal plants) to deregulated arms-
length companies, they created a perverse cost recovery incentive. When those coal assets 
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performed poorly in the shale boom era, utilities sought riders through their regulated distribution 
businesses to compensate for losses of their deregulated generation businesses. The largest share 
of this burden was passed to households.  
The classical model for electric deregulation includes unbundling of generation from 
regulated utility functions in order to remove the temptation for regulated utilities to preferentially 
exercise their monopoly power to cross-subsidize their deregulated generation businesses. Absent 
protection against this behavior, scholars predicted behavior that would crowd out competition 
(Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). Our results provide some evidence to suggest that corporate 
separation is insufficient to remove important cross-subsidy incentives. It is interesting to note that 
Hartley, Medlock, and Jankovska’s (2017) work, which also uses total bill data but focuses on 
Texas, finds evidence of changes in cross-subsidy that benefit residential customers. Notably, 
Texas enforced strict, full divestiture of generation assets and therefore promotes pass-through of 
market costs to retail customers. Replication studies examining similar total bill data in other 
restructured geographies, coupled with in-depth examination of policy implementation and design, 
could further corroborate these findings regarding divestiture. 
This paper also provides insights about both Ohio’s restructuring and the risks of imperfect 
retail restructuring more broadly. Ohio’s retail restructuring law (SB 221) allowed mechanisms 
for utilities to seek additional cost-recovery in the form of non-bypassable riders and surcharges. 
Further compounding the issue, the ESP process in Ohio does not obligate the same procedural 
checks-and-balances as traditional cost-of-service regulation. In essence, Ohio created a 
competitive ratemaking mechanism but retained single-issue ratemaking, just as many other states 
retained elements of regulated ratemaking. As Joskow (2008) and others note, incomplete or 
imperfect market reform is the status quo in most states and countries that adopted retail 
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restructuring. The presence of residual regulatory interference appears to undermine the potential 
benefits of competition. Regulators and legislators interested in understanding the differential 
effects of retail restructuring might, therefore, be better served looking inwards – at political and 
regulatory processes that affect these markets – before adjudicating the theory of deregulation. 
Similarly, researchers might finally settle the ambiguity about the impact of electric deregulation 
with better specification of the additional, non-market determinants of deregulation outcomes.  
Likewise, these findings have potentially significant implications for the efficiency of 
wholesale markets. Regulatory subsidization of generation units can have both short run and long 
run adverse efficiency consequences for wholesale markets (Dormady, 2017). These consequences 
would be borne out in the short run if Type II cross-subsidization allows utility-affiliated gencos 
to displace more efficient generation units in the unit commitment process. And, these 
consequences would be borne out in the long run if cross-subsidization delays efficient retirement 
decisions and discourages market entry by more efficient units.  
We acknowledge that there may be important societal benefits, including economic 
development rationales, that would justify inter-class cross-subsidization. In other words, the exact 
ratio of cross-subsidization from households to job creators is a political and normative exercise 
rather than an empirical one. Here we simply report the results of our analyses that provide 
evidence that relative prices changed in important ways with the implementation of retail 
restructuring rather than by an elected legislature. Given that Ohio’s post-restructuring competition 
construct is a CBP procurement auction that results in a single price to all three SSO customer 
classes, these results run counter to expectations that a single price would tend to harmonize inter-
class differentials. They do, however, confirm Borenstein and Bushnell’s (2015) argument that an 
underlying motivation for reform was always rent shifting. That is, residential customer’s share of 
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costs appears to increase after restructuring. Additionally, the results suggest that regulators 
approved riders and surcharges that were used to cross-subsidize deregulated generation, and they 
were disproportionately added to residential customers’ bills. This counters the narrative that 
restructuring eliminated Type I cross-subsidy. 
We also note that Type I cross-subsidization is not generally an unexpected outcome of at-
least partially regulated industries. Since Mancur Olson’s (1965) seminal work on collective 
action, we have understood that oftentimes deliberative agency processes result in diffuse costs 
and concentrated benefits. Allowing differentials in cost across customer class to result from 
formalized rate-setting processes creates an incentive for rent seeking that puts diffuse interests, 
such as households, at a potential disadvantage relative to industrial interest groups in commission 
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Appendix A.  Regression Tables 
Table A1. Regression Analysis of Retail Price (Residential Bills) 
RESIDENTIAL MARGINAL PRICE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
XTSCC XTSCC-I XTSCC XTSCC-I 
     
Deregulation 1.159  1.095*  
 (0.601)  (0.519)  
Deregulation_FirstEnergy  -2.241**  0.1681 
  (0.694)  (0.762) 
Deregulation_AEP  3.774***  2.472** 
  (0.806)  (0.775) 
Deregulation_Duke  -2.303*  -2.281 
  (0.986)  (1.233) 
Deregulation_DP&L  -0.559  -0.481 
  (0.968)  (1.015) 
NatGasDeliv_Price -0.0467*    
 (0.0201)    
GasPrice_FirstEnergy  -0.0794*   
  (0.0349)   
GasPrice_AEP  -0.0239   
  (0.0368)   
GasPrice_Duke  -0.0303   
  (0.0516)   
GasPrice_DP&L  -0.0512***   
  (0.0118)   
Deregulation_GasPrice -0.242**    
 (0.0879)    
Deregulation_GasPrice_FirstEnergy  -0.138   
  (0.0865)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_AEP  -0.637***   
  (0.126)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_Duke  0.342*   
  (0.166)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_DP&L  0.339   
  (0.203)   
CoalDeliv_Price 0.0135 0.517   
 (0.596) (0.469)   
LMP   -0.00119  
   (0.00531)  
LMP_FirstEnergy    0.0221** 
    (0.00785) 
LMP_AEP    -0.0011 
    (0.00697) 
LMP_Duke    -0.0262 
    (0.0151) 
LMP_DP&L    -0.0110* 
    (0.00543) 
Deregulation_LMP   -0.0292**  
   (0.00991)  
Deregulation_LMP_FirstEnergy    -0.0569*** 
    (0.0133) 
Deregulation_LMP_AEP    -0.0470** 
    (0.0161) 
Deregulation_LMP_Duke    0.0225 
    (0.0281) 
Deregulation_LMP_DP&L    0.0271 
    (0.0215) 
41 
Div_Com_Stock (billions) 10.81*** 2.237 10.59** 3.095 
 (2.894) (2.060) (3.201) (2.336) 
Div_Pref_Stock (billions) -8.031* 3.241 6.920 9.128* 
 (3.821) (3.700) (3.767) (4.132) 
Tot_Op_Expn (billions) -0.625 -1.777*** 0.252 -0.776 
 (0.571) (0.402) (1.004) (0.640) 
Res_Sales_Mwh (millions) 4.393*** 2.512*** 4.008*** 3.150*** 
 (0.588) (0.517) (0.596) (0.520) 
Comm_Sales_Mwh (millions) -0.734 -0.842 -0.430 -0.146 
 (0.790) (0.469) (0.759) (0.513) 
Ind_Sales_Mwh (millions) -1.772*** -1.864*** -1.905*** -1.825*** 
 (0.376) (0.288) (0.392) (0.322) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 11.65*** 12.38*** 9.921*** 11.038*** 
 (1.151) (0.861) (0.334) (0.294) 
N 1,092 1,092 1,005 1,005 
R-squared 0.432 0.709 0.460 0.662 
F 45.88 124.6 57.74 335.04 
Models report fixed effects panel regression estimates with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors using the xtscc subroutine in Stata 14. 


































Table A2. Regression Analysis of Retail Price (Industrial Bills) 
INDUSTRIAL MARGINAL PRICE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
XTSCC XTSCC-I XTSCC XTSCC-I 
     
Deregulation 1.205  0.907  
 (0.650)  (0.638)  
Deregulation_FirstEnergy  -3.596***  -2.804** 
  (0.732)  (0.791) 
Deregulation_AEP  3.119***  2.745*** 
  (0.687)  (0.579) 
Deregulation_Duke  -2.468**  -2.977* 
  (1.001)  (1.224) 
Deregulation_DP&L  0.906  1.335 
  (0.869)  (0.925) 
NatGasDeliv_Price -0.0205    
 (0.0201)    
GasPrice_FirstEnergy  -0.0225   
  (0.0254)   
GasPrice_AEP  -0.0171   
  (0.0299)   
GasPrice_Duke  -0.0789   
  (0.0572)   
GasPrice_DP&L  0.00565   
  (0.0353)   
Deregulation_GasPrice -0.172    
 (0.0969)    
Deregulation_GasPrice_FirstEnergy  -0.0784   
  (0.123)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_AEP  -0.475***   
  (0.0927)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_Duke  0.457**   
  (0.149)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_DP&L  0.145   
  (0.172)   
CoalDeliv_Price 0.353 0.915**   
 (0.552) (0.340)   
LMP   -0.00985  
   (0.00698)  
LMP_FirstEnergy    0.00155 
    (0.00572) 
LMP_AEP    0.00321 
    (0.00568) 
LMP_Duke    -0.0417** 
    (0.0159) 
LMP_DP&L    0.000546 
    (0.00847) 
Deregulation_LMP   -0.0111  
   (0.0112)  
Deregulation_LMP_FirstEnergy    -0.0203 
    (0.0146) 
Deregulation_LMP_AEP    -0.0437*** 
    (0.0116) 
Deregulation_LMP_Duke    0.0601* 
    (0.0258) 
Deregulation_LMP_DP&L    0.00286 
    (0.0174) 
Div_Com_Stock (billions) 7.299* -4.543 9.182** -1.464 
 (3.304) (2.643) (3.517) (2.445) 
43 
Div_Pref_Stock (billions) -1.637 14.32 16.87*** 18.87* 
 (7.071) (8.187) (4.242) (8.671) 
Tot_Op_Expn (billions) -0.604 -0.796 0.197 -0.0231 
 (0.634) (0.414) (1.201) (0.672) 
Res_Sales_Mwh (millions) 3.976*** 1.647*** 3.501*** 2.198*** 
 (0.512) (0.384) (0.541) (0.433) 
Comm_Sales_Mwh (millions) -1.716** -1.209** -1.490* -0.814* 
 (0.661) (0.335) (0.634) (0.347) 
Ind_Sales_Mwh (millions) -1.916*** -1.945*** -1.885*** -1.802*** 
 (0.407) (0.241) (0.402) (0.258) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 8.946*** 9.295*** 7.822*** 9.493*** 
 (1.020) (0.676) (0.463) (0.327) 
N 1,092 1,092 1,005 1,005 
R-squared 0.177 0.668 0.206 0.638 
F 17.07 198.9 43.40 174.84 
Models report fixed effects panel regression estimates with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors using the xtscc subroutine in Stata 14. 




































Table A3. Regression Analysis of Retail Price (Commercial Bills) 
COMMERCIAL MARGINAL PRICE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
XTSCC XTSCC-I XTSCC XTSCC-I 
     
Deregulation 1.700**  1.285*  
 (0.584)  (0.535)  
Deregulation_FirstEnergy  -1.828**  -0.363 
  (0.630)  (0.767) 
Deregulation_AEP  4.273***  3.381*** 
  (0.658)  (0.654) 
Deregulation_Duke  -1.304  -2.355* 
  (0.901)  (1.104) 
Deregulation_DP&L  0.249  -0.0033 
  (0.831)  (0.911) 
NatGasDeliv_Price -0.0417    
 (0.0217)    
GasPrice_FirstEnergy  -0.0585*   
  (0.0277)   
GasPrice_AEP  -0.0191   
  (0.0395)   
GasPrice_Duke  -0.0677   
  (0.0529)   
GasPrice_DP&L  -0.0434**   
  (0.0136)   
Deregulation_GasPrice -0.267**    
 (0.0797)    
Deregulation_GasPrice_FirstEnergy  -0.172   
  (0.0938)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_AEP  -0.621***   
  (0.0938)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_Duke  0.359**   
  (0.143)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_DP&L  0.203   
  (0.163)   
CoalDeliv_Price 0.0785 0.589   
 (0.571) (0.381)   
LMP   -0.00684  
   (0.0054)  
LMP_FirstEnergy    0.01037 
    (0.00675) 
LMP_AEP    0.00262 
    (0.00780) 
LMP_Duke    -0.0392** 
    (0.0155) 
LMP_DP&L    -0.0119* 
    (0.00497) 
Deregulation_LMP   -0.0230*  
   (0.00989)  
Deregulation_LMP_FirstEnergy    -0.0425** 
    (0.0150) 
Deregulation_LMP_AEP    -0.0517** 
    (0.0139) 
Deregulation_LMP_Duke    0.0562* 
    (0.0252) 
Deregulation_LMP_DP&L    0.0215 
    (0.0181) 
Div_Com_Stock (billions) 11.12*** 1.679 11.13** 2.889 
 (2.860) (1.709) (3.193) (1.931) 
45 
Div_Pref_Stock (billions) 2.294 15.99 19.51** 24.20* 
 (8.673) (10.02) (7.193) (11.05) 
Tot_Op_Expn (billions) -0.121 -0.271 0.671 0.604 
 (0.589) (0.441) (1.081) (0.668) 
Res_Sales_Mwh (millions) 4.162*** 1.936*** 3.738*** 2.479*** 
 (0.460) (0.454) (0.468) (0.441) 
Comm_Sales_Mwh (millions) -0.791 -0.605 -0.545 -0.0697 
 (0.692) (0.377) (0.651) (0.419) 
Ind_Sales_Mwh (millions) -2.932*** -3.074*** -2.974*** -2.991*** 
 (0.399) (0.323) (0.407) (0.340) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 10.77*** 11.32*** 9.115*** 10.343*** 
 (1.061) (0.717) (0.372) (0.364) 
N 1,092 1,092 1,005 1,005 
R-squared 0.302 0.681 0.341 0.630 
F 29.31 266.5 45.91 261.53 
Models report fixed effects panel regression estimates with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors using the xtscc subroutine in Stata 14. 




































Table A4. Regression Analysis of Residential/Industrial Marginal Price Ratio  
RESIDENTIAL/INDUSTRIAL MARGINAL PRICE 
RATIO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
XTSCC XTSCC-I XTSCC XTSCC-I 
     
Deregulation -0.0736  -0.0514  
 (0.0532)  (0.0533)  
Deregulation_FirstEnergy  0.143  0.236** 
  (0.0911)  (0.0834) 
Deregulation_AEP  -0.0234  -0.109 
  (0.0720)  (0.0853) 
Deregulation_Duke  0.130  0.224 
  (0.0963)  (0.119) 
Deregulation_DP&L  -0.255**  -0.286** 
  (0.0690)  (0.0801) 
NatGasDeliv_Price -0.00128    
 (0.00205)    
GasPrice_FirstEnergy  -0.00499   
  (0.00317)   
GasPrice_AEP  0.000281   
  (0.00198)   
GasPrice_Duke  0.0120   
  (0.00659)   
GasPrice_DP&L  -0.00614   
  (0.00522)   
Deregulation_GasPrice -0.00516    
 (0.00803)    
Deregulation_GasPrice_FirstEnergy  0.00326   
  (0.0141)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_AEP  -0.0175   
  (0.0121)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_Duke  -0.0347**   
  (0.0135)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_DP&L  0.0274**   
  (0.0109)   
CoalDeliv_Price -0.0457 -0.0583   
 (0.0517) (0.0492)   
LMP   0.00103*  
   (0.000521)  
LMP_FirstEnergy    0.00116 
    (0.000674) 
LMP_AEP    -0.000547 
    (0.000291) 
LMP_Duke    0.00435** 
    (0.00169) 
LMP_DP&L    -0.00132 
    (0.00129) 
Deregulation_LMP   -0.00157  
   (0.000865)  
Deregulation_LMP_FirstEnergy    -0.00146 
    (0.00166) 
Deregulation_LMP_AEP    -0.000818 
    (0.00178) 
Deregulation_LMP_Duke    -0.00732** 
    (0.00226) 
Deregulation_LMP_DP&L    0.00329* 
    (0.00154) 
Div_Com_Stock (billions) -0.0605 0.622** -0.253 0.432 
 (0.262) (0.231) (0.274) (0.229) 
47 
Div_Pref_Stock (billions) -1.090* -1.917** -2.190*** -2.216*** 
 (0.479) (0.580) (0.365) (0.543) 
Tot_Op_Expn (billions) -0.124* -0.171** -0.150 -0.191* 
 (0.0616) (0.0654) (0.105) (0.0875) 
Res_Sales_Mwh (millions) 0.0446 0.102** 0.0614 0.125** 
 (0.0554) (0.0415) (0.0557) (0.0491) 
Ind_Sales_Mwh (millions) 0.100** 0.0600 0.0989** 0.0693* 
 (0.0391) (0.0311) (0.0387) (0.0316) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 1.424*** 1.439*** 1.408*** 1.301*** 
 (0.0937) (0.0906) (0.0416) (0.0333) 
N 1,092 1,092 1,005 1,005 
R-squared 0.362 0.558 0.371 0.559 
F 60.55 84.90 61.93 68.87 
Models report fixed effects panel regression estimates with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors using the xtscc subroutine in Stata 14. 






































Table A5. Regression Analysis of Residential/Commercial Marginal Price Ratio 
RESIDENTIAL/COMMERCIAL MARGINAL 
PRICE RATIO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
XTSCC XTSCC-I XTSCC XTSCC-I 
     
Deregulation -0.0623**  -0.0362*  
 (0.0171)  (0.0172)  
Deregulation_FirstEnergy  -0.0155  0.0360 
  (0.0367)  (0.0332) 
Deregulation_AEP  -0.0614  -0.0711 
  (0.0438)  (0.0491) 
Deregulation_Duke  -0.0101  0.0774 
  (0.0524)  (0.0592) 
Deregulation_DP&L  -0.0983***  -0.0816** 
  (0.0261)  (0.0235) 
NatGasDeliv_Price 0.000418    
 (0.000848)    
GasPrice_FirstEnergy  -0.00143   
  (0.00142)   
GasPrice_AEP  0.000620   
  (0.00183)   
GasPrice_Duke  0.00531   
  (0.00323)   
GasPrice_DP&L  0.000389   
  (0.00166)   
Deregulation_GasPrice 0.00395    
 (0.00262)    
Deregulation_GasPrice_FirstEnergy  0.00816   
  (0.00565)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_AEP  -0.000565   
  (0.00767)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_Duke  -0.00992   
  (0.00677)   
Deregulation_GasPrice_DP&L  0.0114**   
  (0.00458)   
CoalDeliv_Price -0.0115 -0.0186   
 (0.0206) (0.0190)   
LMP   0.000576**  
   (0.000221)  
LMP_FirstEnergy    0.000699* 
    (0.000319) 
LMP_AEP    -0.0000553 
    (0.000396) 
LMP_Duke    0.00161 
    (0.000867) 
LMP_DP&L    0.00000430 
    (0.000262) 
Deregulation_LMP   -0.000267  
   (0.000346)  
Deregulation_LMP_FirstEnergy    0.0000427 
    (0.000763) 
Deregulation_LMP_AEP    0.0000197 
    (0.00113) 
Deregulation_LMP_Duke    -0.00362** 
    (0.00112) 
Deregulation_LMP_DP&L    0.000792 
    (0.000457) 
Div_Com_Stock (billions) -0.163 0.0438 -0.189 0.00976 
 (0.166) (0.133) (0.174) (0.134) 
49 
Div_Pref_Stock (billions) 0.162 -0.225 0.000838 -0.204 
 (0.663) (0.718) (0.770) (0.937) 
Tot_Op_Expn (billions) -0.0696** -0.116** -0.0662 -0.108** 
 (0.0282) (0.0346) (0.0360) (0.0391) 
Res_Sales_Mwh (millions) -0.0115 0.0302 -0.00910 0.0332 
 (0.0365) (0.0319) (0.0357) (0.0347) 
Comm_Sales_Mwh (millions) 0.0951** 0.0611* 0.0961** 0.0707* 
 (0.0257) (0.0293) (0.0257) (0.0289) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 1.167*** 1.181*** 1.153*** 1.125*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0344) (0.0243) (0.0286) 
N 1,092 1,092 1,005 1,005 
R-squared 0.257 0.354 0.265 0.352 
F 40.01 58.87 45.61 52.75 
Models report fixed effects panel regression estimates with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors using the xtscc subroutine in Stata 14. 




Appendix B.  Supplemental Figures (for reviewers only) 
 
Figure A1. Marginal Price of Representative, Total Electric Bill (by class and 
metro area) 
Note: Figure provides the monthly inflation-corrected marginal price by customer class for each of the 




Figure A2. Statewide Mean Electricity Price 
Note: Figure provides the mean monthly inflation-corrected statewide aggregate electricity prices by customer class. The 




Figure A3. Inter-Class Marginal Price Ratios (by metro area) 
Note: Figure provides the monthly marginal price ratios by major metro area.  
 
